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Abstract
Changes in global development policy orientation that put the community (society) rather
than the state as its main target has been raised various debates about how to create a
better society for development processes. This paper critically discuss the discourse of
governance as an instrument of regulation in the new development model through some
conceptual apparatus such as social capital, participation and deliberative democracy.
Through a post-foundationalist approaches and studies of post-Suharto Indonesia, this
paper examined the operation of governance discourse. The main thesis is that the ab-
sence of the dimension of power in governance has ignored the political configuration and
even failed to notice the various interests in society.
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Abstrak
Perubahan orientasi kebijakan pembangunan global yang menempatkan masyarakat
(society), bukan lagi negara, sebagai target utamanya telah memunculkan berbagai
perdebatan tentang bagaimana menciptakan masyarakat yang lebih baik bagi proses-
proses pembangunan. Paper ini secara kritis mendiskusikan wacana governance sebagai
sebuah instrumen pengaturan dan pendisiplinan masyarakat dalam model
pembangunan baru melalui beberapa aparatus konseptual seperti social capital,
partisipasi, dan demokrasi deliberatif. Melalui pendekatan post-fondasionalis dan studi-
studi Indonesia pasca-Suharto, paper ini memeriksa beroperasinya wacana governance.
Tesis utamanya adalah bahwa absennya dimensi kekuasaan dalam governance telah
mengabaikan konfigurasi politik dan bahkan gagal memperhatikan pelbagai kepentingan
dalam masyarakat.
Kata Kunci:
pemerintahan, pembangunan baru; modal sosial; partisipasi; demokrasi deliberatif;
kekuasaan
To say that ‘everything is political’ is to recognize
the omnipresence of relations of force and their immanence to a political field.
Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge
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Introduction
Since the programs of deregulation,
privatization and market reform—fre-
quently labeled as neo-liberalism— faced
any significant resistances and failures in
most of developing countries, the interna-
tional development agencies immediately
changed their orientations in the 1990s. The
World Bank, as a leading developmental in-
stitution, initiated a new wave of policy that
acknowledged the state as no longer a levia-
than, but an enabler of networks and rela-
tionships that foster economic competitive-
ness (World Bank, 1991: 3). The society was
consequently perceived as active partici-
pants, instead of beneficaries, in the current
development programs. Such orientation,
known as governance, leads to be a newly
political strategy to run sustainable develop-
ment and to build democracy worldwide.
Governance has become the latest stage
in development discourses (Abrahamsen,
2004; Hyden, 2006). The perspectives on de-
velopment which previously focus on the
programs of structural adjustment—or neo-
liberal—need to be reconsidered. According
to the World Bank, the efforts to reduce the
state’s roles in economic fields are not solely
an urgent agenda, but “that the political le-
gitimacy and consensus is the prerequisite
for the sustainable development” (World
Bank, 1989: 60). Within this new discourse,
democratization is not exclusively called for
by the perspectives on human rights, but it
also supposed to be an essential foundation
for economic growth and sustainable welfare.
In developing countries, the rise of gover-
nance signals the apparent rupture with the
previous development strategy that highly
put economic growth as its target and even-
tually subordinate democracy.
Unlike the classical perspectives on de-
velopment that situate individual and social
groups as objects or beneficiaries of develop-
ment, the new orientation conceives them as
the active forces to support development pro-
cesses (Hadiz, 2010; Hadiz, 2003: 3). Gover-
nance, therefore, leads to be an essential
framework to manage society and social
groups in order to ensure the operation of
development and liberal markets. In result,
not only has governance changed the archi-
tecture of political institutions, but it has ef-
fectively become a political discourse to dis-
cipline society.
This paper seeks to provide a critical un-
derstanding on governance as a new perspec-
tive in ordering contemporary politics and
society. It is not an empirical study on Indo-
nesian politics, but an effort to reframe the
various paradigms by which the post-
Suharto Indonesian politics were explained.
The fall of the New Order has been widely
celebrated as the so-called “democratic tran-
sition”, and governance then became a main-
stream perspective to insist any reforms
through democratization labels. Such opti-
mism in establishing the more stable demo-
cracy, however, has been eroded when the
newly democracy arrangements were unable
to create accountable and effective institu-
tions and even failed to be the foundation of
stable democracy and social welfare (Har-
ris, et.al. 2004; Robison and Hadiz, 2004;
Norholt and Klinken, 2007; McLeod and
MacIntyre, 2007).
This paper will be divided into three parts.
The first section discusses the convergence of
governance and neo-institutionalism perspec-
tive as dominant paradigms in the post-
Suharto Indonesian politics. There was a gen-
eral optimism, supported by the donor insti-
It is an “anti-politics machine, depoliticizing everything it touches,
everywhere whisking political realities out of sight,
all the while performing, almost unnoticed…
James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine
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tutions foremost, that democratic transition is
merely a matter of creating an institutional
format that enable to enforce democratization.
Not surprisingly, the agenda to design the
architecture of political institutions subse-
quently grows to be the ultimate focus of such
reforms. However, as revealed by various
studies, the establishment of democratic in-
stitutions did not simultaneously go hand in
hand with the democratization processes.
Second, to elucidate how the discourse
and politics of governance operate effectively
for both ordering politics and disciplining
society. In order to improve political partici-
pation and to open up political arenas, go-
vernance has adopted the idea of delibera-
tive democracy—the ideology of an utopian
dream on the establishment of public sphere
by which common preferences and interests
are possibly managed through consensus
building. Furthermore, by exploiting civil
society empowerment and social capital dis-
courses, the projects of governance tend to
build a certain type of society that are able
to be technocratically controlled and to make
it functional for supporting liberal markets.
The last section investigates the fundamen-
tal problems of the mainstream perspective
in governance and its implications that have
extremely neglected the political dimension
and power relations in its epistemological
foundations.
Governance and Neo-institutionalism
In the seminal publication, Sub-Saharan
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development,
the World Bank had identified “poor gover-
nance”— to refer the centrality of power, lack
of respect on human rights, endemic corrup-
tion, ineffective and unaccountable govern-
ment institutions—as the ultimate sources of
development failure in the Sub-Saharan Africa
and developing countries in general (World
Bank, 1989: 60). By imposing governance prin-
ciple as “the manner in which political power
is exercised in the management of a country’s
affairs”, the World Bank then adopted “good
governance” doctrine as a new strategy for de-
velopment management, particularly to build
transparent and accountable institutions, rule
of law, freedom of press, participation, as well
as to establish the more pluralistic and legiti-
mate political structures (World Bank, 1989: 61,
192).
Although there was no specific term of
democracy, the various reports had obviously
shown that liberal democracy was claimed
to be the precondition for better economic
development. Meanwhile, the governance
discourse also emerged at the time when the
Communist regimes collapsed that soon ex-
claimed by Francis Fukuyama (1989) as “the
end of history”. That is the thesis of “the end
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and
the universalization of western liberal democ-
racy as the final form of human govern-
ment” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). Liberal democ-
racy, therefore, is inevitably an assertion of
Western values superiority, and governance
then becomes the discursive instruments as
new mode of interventions and reforms. In
the most cited work, Democracy in Develop-
ing Countries, Diamond, Linz and Lipset
(1988: 1) also celebrate the triumph of lib-
eral democracy as the zeitgeist of new glo-
bal order within which “democracy is the
ultimate model of government with the most
accepted and appropriate ideological legiti-
macy for the current world”.
The economic development reforms, ac-
cording to the World Bank, are impossibly
achieved without any concern on political
reforms (World Bank, 1989: 14). The World
Bank henceforth strongly supports the do-
nor institutions to be more selective in deliv-
ering their funds to the countries that highly
commit to undertake political reforms. Such
principles are then widely welcomed and fi-
nancially supported by the international de-
velopment agencies. In 1990, for instance, the
US Agency for International Development
(USAID) launched the program entitled De-
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mocracy Initiative “to support and consoli-
date democracy as the principle to manage
political system legitimately in the world”
(cited via Abrahamsen, 2004: 56). The co-
mmitment of United Kingdom has been ob-
viously stated by the Prime Minister Dou-
glas Hurd on June 1990, that the countries
that concern to “pluralism, public account-
ability, respect to rule of law and human
rights, and market principles must be sup-
ported”.
Besides these bilateral institutions, the
support to governance campaign also de-
rived from multilateral organizations. Some
prominent organizations, such as the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development), decided their financial aids to
exclusively support the countries that are will-
ing to undertake various market reforms. The
European Union (EU) has also asserted the
urgency to assist the countries that are trying
to establish the appropriate basis for develop-
ment, including to set up effective and account-
able political institutions and to improve demo-
cratic legitimacy (Abrahamsen, 2004: 56-57).
By exploiting governance discourses, the
donor institutions introduce any political con-
ditions for aids that link their financial supports
with the commitment to undertake reforms at
the expense of the more pluralistic system in
the recipient countries (Abrahamsen, 2004: 57).
This new discourse is mostly typical in deve-
lopment debates, since it narrates the poverty
and development failures as a chain of what
are absent in the developing countries, namely
the lack of democracy and effective institutions.
Through such strategies, therefore, they have
political legitimacy to effectively intervene and
discipline the developing countries (Escobar,
1995). Unlike the previous development ap-
proaches at the time of Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) which utilized “policies” as
an ultimate mechanism for transformation, the
governance perspective focused prominently
on the architectural change of political institu-
tions (Hyden, 2006; MacIntyre, 2003; Kjaer,
2004; March and Olson, 1995).
The fundamental consideration upon the
institutional designs is a typical approach in
governance debates (Hyden, 2006). Such
thoughts, widely clustered as neo-institution-
alism, which are predominantly adopted by
donor institutions, particularly the World Bank,
grew to be a mainstream orientations in the
contemporary development policies (Stiglitz,
1998). The main argument is that institutions
shall regulate behavior by structuring interac-
tion. Unlike the old-institutionalist which fo-
cused solely on the formal institutions, the neo-
institutionalists expand the definition of insti-
tutions to include their regulative and cogni-
tive dimension.
Although the proponents of neo-institu-
tionalist have different orientations, they
generaly focus on the way interests, prefer-
ences, capacities and identities of those who
participate in governance processes are con-
ditioned by the institutions they are embed-
ded. The rational choice neo-institutionalists,
Fritz Scharpf (1994) for instance, defines gov-
ernance institutions as merely game struc-
tures that govern behavior through the fram-
ing of utilitarian rational choices. Meanwhile,
the constructivist or sociological neo-
isntitutionalists, as James G. March and
Johan P. Olson (1995: 7), conceptualize gov-
ernance institutions as relatively fixed uni-
verse of meaning that condition the way ac-
tors perceive themselves, other people and the
rule-governed situations in which they are
placed.
The domination of neo-institutionalist
tradition led by the World Bank and donor
institutions has strongly determined the ef-
forts to structure political institutions in de-
veloping countries. The influences of the neo-
institutionalists are easily traced on the evo-
lution of how the World Bank defines gover-
nance. In 1989, the World Bank defined gov-
ernance as “the manner in which power is
exercised in the management of a country’s
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and social resource for development” (World
Bank, 1989: 60). In the 2000 World Bank re-
port, however, governance was apparently
identified as “the institutional capacity for
public organization to provide the public and
other goods demanded by a country’s citi-
zens or their representatives in an effective,
transparent, impartial, and accountable
manner, subject to resource constrains”
(World Bank, 2000: 48).
In the case of Indonesian politics, the
convergence of neo-institutionalism and gov-
ernance are deeply rooted in the context of
devastating political economic structures in
the aftermath of Asian crisis and the post-
New Order authoritarianism. The fragile
structures of Indonesian economic was pri-
marily considered as an inevitable conse-
quences of the developmental state model
that extremely ignored market rationality
and failed to create effective and transpar-
ent roles of the state in economic fields, ulti-
mately in its inability to prevent the preda-
tory characters of rent seeking (Robison and
Hadiz, 2004). Meanwhile, the post-New Or-
der has been optimistically greeted as the so-
called “democratic transition” (Kingsbury
and Budiman 2001; Liddle, 2001). Political
corporatism and authoritarian rule, the
prominent modes of governing during the
Suharto regime, were convincingly acknowl-
edged as the ultimate sources of the death of
democracy and the absence of vibrant civil
society.
Economic reforms, according to the neo-
instiutionalists, therefore, shall be oriented
mainly “to liberate the natural efficiency of
markets from the ‘irrationality’ of politics
and to neutralize those predatory coalitions
whose raids on the state preserved and en-
trenched resistance to market capitalism”
(Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 19). Within this
new scheme, the idea of privatization and
deregulation, as the major prescription in the
development policies since 1980s, shall be
useless without any support of the adequate
institutional capacity (World Bank, 1991: 3).
To search for the appropriate design of insti-
tutional arrangements and to cope with the
problems of governability then become the
prominent and unfinished agenda in the post-
Suharto Indonesia.
In the political realm, the dominant per-
spective in “democratic transitions” debates
was also highly technocratic—they strongly
focus on how to create an institutional frame-
work within which the democratization pro-
cesses are able to bring about (Liddle, 2001).
Besides the implementation of free election
and multi-party system, the democratization
project in Indonesia was also supposed to be
parallel with decentralization and the emer-
gence of civil society (Aspinal and Fealy,
2003). In general, neo-institutionlist literatures
optimistically argue that the shift of central-
istic model into the more decentralize go-
vernment would simultaneously go hand in
hand with the stable democracy and public
participation (Cheema and Rondinelli, eds.,
2007).
Governing through the Social,
Depoliticising the Political
The shift in political architectures to be
more pluralistic, as supported by neo-insti-
tutionalists, was exclaimed by Mark Warren
(1992) as a phenomenon of ‘expansive de-
mocracy’. This, according to Warren, is
mainly characterized by the “increased par-
ticipation, either by means of small-scale di-
rect democracy or through strong linkages
between citizens and broad-scale institutions
and by pushing democracy beyond tradi-
tional political spheres” (Hajer and
Wagenaar, 2003: 3). In other words, through
the doctrine of governance the political land-
scape has been apparently transformed from
the state as an ultimate focus in the previous
development debates to the more society-
based explanations.
Neo-institusionalist literatures heavily
suggest that a vibrant civil society shall con-
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tribute—indeed required as a prior condi-
tion—to support development and demo-
cratization (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama,
1999;). Rather than focused on the state re-
forms as embedded in the previous develop-
mental orientations, the governance doctrine
has strongly insisted to deal with society. As
clearly affirmed by the World Bank that:
Eleven years since the fall of the Berlin Wall
we now approach economic reforms and the
development process in a much more
decentralized fashion. Individuals and
various social groups are now seen not only
as beneficiaries, but also as active forces
supporting development (World Bank, cited
in Hadiz, 2003: 3).
In line with the World Bank’s argu-
ments, decentralization program is not only
required to prevent the centrality of power
as proposed by pro-democratic groups, but
it is also strongly required within the neo-
liberal model of development. Decentraliza-
tion in the neo-institutionalist literatures is
regarded—or mystified—as an architectural
scheme by which democratization, economic
development, and public services could be
achieved in the local levels (Smith, 1985;
Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).
In Indonesia, however, decentralization
programs were also supported by civil-soci-
ety based organizations, although many of
them are generally critical of both gover-
nment and international organizations, par-
ticularly the roles of World Bank and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). This, accord-
ing to Hadiz (2004: 6), partly due to the neo-
liberal agenda, as massively campaigned by
the international development organizations,
has “successfully incorporated, indeed appro-
priated, the idea of civil society” which it is
also strongly defended by the pro-democratic
groups in Indonesia (Hadiz, 2010).
The paradoxical convergence between
the neo-liberal and pro-democratic agenda
was prominently demonstrated in utilizing
the spurious notion of social capital in pro-
moting civil society (Fine, 2001; Harris,
2002). The social capital has become general
norms and values that tightly bind people
and other communities. It is generally said
that decentralization shall lead to greater
orientation of local needs in development
policy, since it encourages greater account-
ability of those who govern close to local
people (Aspinal and Fealy, 2003: 4-8). Ha-
ving profoundly insisted the institutional re-
forms, the World Bank then put its empha-
sis on how to work with civil society. The
World Bank acknowledged that “while do-
nors and outsiders can contribute resources
and ideas to improve governance, for change
to be effective, it must be rooted firmly in
the societies concerned, and cannot be im-
posed from outside” (World Bank, 1991: 6).
Defined by Robert Putnam (1993: 167)
as “trust, norms, and networks that can im-
prove the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated action”, social capital was sub-
sequently promoted by the World Bank as a
mantra to discipline society that enable in
supporting the liberal markets. It is
technocratically defined as “the norms and
social relations embedded in the social struc-
tures of societies that enable people to coor-
dinate action to achieve desired goals”
(World Bank website, cited in Harris, 2002:
84). Thus social capital is functionally ori-
ented—and widely believed—to moderate
political conflict within the democratic pro-
cesses and to build institutional capacities
(Fine, 2001). Moreover, in the provocative
paper, Social Capital and Civil Society,
Fukuyama (1999) insists that social capital
is highly imperative “to the efficient running
of modern economies, and is the sine qua non
of stable liberal democracy”. In result, the
economic function of social capital in the
World Bank perspective is simply to reduce
the “transaction costs” in ordering society.
The concept of social capital effectively
became a significant basis to technically deal
with public participation which is complex
in characters. According to the neo-institu-
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tionalists, an important element in govern-
ing contemporary society is the construction
of images of communality and collective
identity (March and Olson, 1995: 49). This
idea obviously conceives polity as a consen-
sus which is eventually constructed in and
through political processes. As a matter of
fact, the neo-institutionalists view politics as
merely a matter of consensus building, a-
ggregating preferences, and public reason
making (March and Olson, 1995: 45-46).
Such images of communality and col-
lective identity that neo-institutionalists pro-
posed strongly relate to the idea of delibera-
tive democracy. The notion of deliberative de-
mocracy, argued by Joshua Cohen, “is rooted
in the intuitive ideal of a democratic associa-
tion in which the justification of the terms
and conditions of association proceeds
through public argument and reasoning
among equal citizens” (1997: 2 cited in
Cunningham, 2002: 163). Within the delib-
erative model, as highly advocated by neo-
institutionalists, the presence of legitimate
institutions as the ones that provide demo-
cratic procedures by which participation and
discursive will formation pursued is inevi-
table. As Seyla Benhabib, another delibera-
tive democracy proponent, noticed that:
It is a necessary condition for attaining
legitimacy and rationality with regard to
collective decision making processes in a
polity, that the institutions of this polity are
so arranged that what is considered in the
common interest of all result from processes
of collective deliberation conducted
rationally and fairly among free and equal
individuals (Benhabib, 1996: 69).
Deliberative democracy theorists, there-
fore, put the heart of democracy in “the pub-
lic sphere” that mediate the realm between
civil society and the state (Habermas, 1996;
Cohen, 1996; Benhabib, 1996). It is the space
where citizens talk about their common af-
fairs and the site where public discourse cir-
culate. It consists of civic associations, social
movements, interests groups, media and
other arenas of public opinion formation.
With the same notions, the World Bank, de-
fined civil society ambiguously as “space
among family, market and state; it consists
of not-for-profit organisations and special
interest groups, either formal and informal,
working to improve the lives of their constitu-
ents” (World Bank, 2000: 10).
Bringing the Power Dimension Back
In: The Post-foundationalist Critics
The epistemological basis of neo-institu-
tionalists on governance which deeply rooted
in deliberative democracy theory has been
extensively criticized by scholars from vari-
ous traditions. Göran Hydén (2006: 2), for
instance, has problematized the absense of
power dimension in many governance analy-
sis. The dominance of neo-institutionalism in
political sciences that are apparently derived
from the New Institutional Economics theo-
ries, according to Hydén, has notably shifted
the focus on incentive structures and trans-
action cost rather than power relations
(Hydén, 2006: 7). The ultimate belief on the
power of institutions that are able to struc-
ture human behavior in neo-instituionalists
tradition has naively excluded socio-histori-
cal context in where such institutions take
place (MacIntyre, 2003).
The other critics strongly emphasis on
the new modes of governing promoted by
neo-institutionalists in the more operational
level. Kanishka Jayasuriya (2006; Jayasuriya
and Hewison, 2004) identified that there was
a precarious reduction of the idea of “citizen-
ship” as merely “customership” in gover-
nance principles. In result, the participation
is thus required to problem solving or effec-
tive of any management of policy and its
implementation rather than to the achieve-
ment of any legitimate political consensus.
In other words, participation is not seen as
an end itself. On the contrary, it is utilised as
a mechanism for pursuing better techno-
cratic policy outcomes. The notions of par-
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ticipation in the World Bank agenda appar-
ently tend to produce forms of depoliticized
governance that operate to obscure the con-
testation and antagonism that are at the core
of participatory politics (Jayasuriya and
Hewison, 2004: 7).
Equally important to be problematized
is the notion of social capital amongst indi-
vidual and communities that are aggresively
promoted by the World Bank. The problem
of poverty and inequality in the eyes of the
World Bank are often viewed as due to the
lack of social capital (Jayasuriya and
Hewison, 2004; Robison and Hadiz, 2004).
Through the concept of social capital, any
social problems are then approached as a
technical rather than political problem
(Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 25). As a conse-
quence, the social capital has obviously
depoliticized the problems of poverty and
social justice. Thus social capital, to lend John
Harris (2002: 13), is merely “a weapon in the
armory of the anti-politics machine”, be-
cause it is not a civic notion to empower soci-
ety but to make them technocratically man-
ageable.
In response to deliberative democracy
theorists, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe
(1985)—and others in the post-
foundationalist tradition—have persistently
questioned the very epistemological basis of
its theory building. Mouffe (1989) has criti-
cally put into question the objectivism and
essentialism which are dominant in democ-
racy theories, particularly as appeared in de-
liberative democracy. In the influential work,
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics, Laclau and
Mouffe (1985) advanced an approach that
asserts that any social objectivity is consti-
tuted through acts of power. This means that
any social objectivity, such as common goods
and ideals as optimistically argued by delib-
erative theorists, is ultimately and constantly
political that are impossibly perceived as ag-
gregation or consensus of their various in-
terests. It is because that there are no fixed
interests as they are constatantly constituted
with and through other interests. Mouffe
(1996) suggests that:
...[E]very object has inscribed in its very
being something other than itself and that
as result, everything is constructed as
différence, that its being cannot be conceived
as pure “presence” or “objectivity”. Since
the constitutive outside is present within
the inside as its always real possibility,
every identity becomes purely contingen
(Mouffe, 1996: 247).
Following the tradition of post-structur-
alism, such as Derrida and Foucault, the
post-foundationalist scholars locate the heart
of politics in the existential struggle to form
identities and to advance different ways of
life in an environment of contingency, plu-
rality, and power (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985;
Mouffe, 1989). Contrary to deliberative theo-
rists who place consensus as an ontological
basis of ordering complex society, Laclau and
Mouffe put social antagonism and conflict
as a nature of politics (cf. Dryzek, 2005;
Norris, 2006). They subsequently develop
democratic politics from an anti-essentialist
and anti-foundational perspective which
widely called as agonistic democracy. Mouffe
(1996) clearly argues that:
…[T]he relations between social agents
becomes more democratic only insofar as
they accept the particularity and the
limitation of their claims; that is only insofar
as they recognize their mutual relations as
one from which power is ineradicable. The
democratic society cannot be conceived as a
society that would have realized the dream
of a perfect harmony in social relations
(Mouffe, 1996: 248).
Within the agonistic democracy, there-
fore, plurality and diversity are thus not prob-
lems to be overcome. Moreover, the promo-
tion of those differences that do not contra-
dict liberty and equality is the very condi-
tion for the expansion of the democratic revo-
lution (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 166). The
insights of agonistic democracy is highly es-
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sential to criticize the apolitical forms of gov-
ernance which predominantly advocated by
neo-institutionalists. It is too naive— and even
illusory—to deal with diverse interests and
identities as instantly by providing an insti-
tutional framework within which such dif-
ferences are able to be aggregated with the
spurious claims of consensus. The neglectful-
ness of “the political” in governance perspec-
tive, as neo-instiutionalists did, is mostly pre-
carious. “To present the institutions of de-
mocracy as the outcome of a pure delibera-
tive rationality”, Mouffe claims, “is to reify
them and to make them impossible to trans-
form” (Mouffe, 1996: 254).
The ample evidences on Indonesian poli-
tics also confirm the illusive portraits of neo-
institutionalists that treat governance with-
out any appropriate consideration of power
relations. The politics of the post-Suharto In-
donesia which neo-institutionalists optimis-
tically foresaw that it would bring about a
stable democracy and vibrant civil society
was unfortunately unproven. Various stud-
ies conducted couple of years since the fall of
the Suharto regime demonstrate the critical
failure of the neo-isntitutionalists in gover-
nance reforms. Unlike the “democratic tran-
sitions” theorists who see the volatility of In-
donesian politics as simply a characteristic
of a transitional stage on which the eventual
consolidation of democracy shall proceed,
Robison and Hadiz (2004) propose an ap-
proach to understand Indonesian politics in
terms of power relations and interests. Neo-
liberal reforms which predominantly origi-
nated from neo-institutionalist paradigm,
therefore, “cannot be understood as an ab-
straction driven by a collection of technopols
acting above vested interests, but as an
agenda backed by shifting and fluid coali-
tions with a concrete interests in the configu-
ration of power and the institutions that al-
locate it” (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 5). In
other words, reforms or policy making in any
case is not simply a question of rationality
choosing the “right” decisions in a techno-
cratic and value-free manner, as embedded
in good governance doctrines, but it is fun-
damentally shaped by eventual contestation
of competing interests.
Confronting to the neo-liberal explana-
tions, Robison and Hadiz (2004) critically
problematize why deepening integration
with global market and democratization in
the post-crisis Indonesia did not simulta-
neously generate a liberal triumph. Rather
than put the emphasis on how liberal insti-
tutions condition such reforms, Robison and
Hadiz (2004: 18) argue “the uncertain and
volatile progress of market capitalism and
democratic transitions in Indonesia must be
understood in the context of larger conflict
over power and distribution”. The critical
inquiry, Robison and Hadiz (2004: 18) sub-
sequently advance, is “how the interests of
the state and private oligarchy have been
consolidated in an age of rapid economic
growth, the spread of global markets and the
transition to democracy”.
With such lens, they argue that the re-
lationship between decentralization and de-
mocracy is somehow problematic. Besides
Robison and Hadiz who demonstrate how
predatory forces and interests can, to use their
provocative term, “hijack” the progress and
institutions of decentralization, the recent
studies also prove these similar findings
(Sidel, 2004; Nordholt and Klinken, 2007).
Within such a new architecture of politics,
the old-oligarchies with their resources and
networks are not only able to adapt the new
democratic institutions, but they also success-
fully capture it to consolidate their own pow-
ers (Robison and Hadiz, 2003; 2004: 187-249).
In such a case, decentralization and democ-
ratization is likely to have very little capac-
ity to impose a governance agenda based on
transparency and accountability as it is
largely assumed by neo-institutionalists.
Unlike Robison and Hadiz (2003; 2004)
who are strongly influenced by the structur-
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alism tradition, Henk Schulte Nordholt
(2004; cf. Nordholt and Klinken, 2007) con-
fronts neo-institutionalists and democratic
transition theorists from the hitorico-anthro-
pological point of view. Nordholt obviously
argues that:
Although the term ‘transition’ can be used
to indicate the current transfer from one
authoritarian system to another, it does not
capture the complexity of historical
processes are creating contemporary
Indonesia, nor does it offer the opportunity
to trace changing continuities in Indonesian
politics (Nordholt, 2004: 29-30).
By the term “changing continuities”
Nordholt argues that there are somewhat per-
sistent patterns in Indonesian politics which
are not altered by any reforms which mas-
sively conducted after the collapse of the
Suharto regime. Although the box of Indo-
nesian politics has apparently changed
through such institutional reforms, but the
patterns of old society are remains. He iden-
tifies that there are three evidences how the
“changing continuities” are sustained. Those
evidences are including (1) the persistence of
patrimonial ties and the lack of class in In-
donesian politics; (2) the post-colonial nature
of Indonesian politics in which the bound-
aries between state, society, and market never
clear; (3) the historical role of local elites and
the way they use ethnicity and other primor-
dial basis to articulate their interests.
Robison and Hadiz (2004) and Nordholt
(2004), it seems to me, not only demonstrate
the anomaly of the neo-institutionalist gov-
ernance theorists which exclusively appear
in the Indonesian case. They also represent a
major critique of the mainstream paradigm,
as that paradigm has extremely neglected
the power relations within which such re-
forms embedded and it did not take the cer-
tain socio-historical context into consider-
ation. Such efforts clearly confirm what
Hydén (2006) asked to drive the research
beyond governance in mainstream manner
and to bring the dimension of power—or ‘the
political’ to lend Ernesto Laclau—back into
political analysis
Concluding Remarks
Bringing the power dimension back into
governance analysis is mostly essential. As
Göran Hydén suggest that “not only will
such an approach ensure a feedback on how
the political system works, but it will also
foster a degree of humility that after almost
half a century of trying may be badly war-
ranted in the international development com-
munity”. The contributions of Robison and
Hadiz (2004) and Nordholt (2004) to criti-
cize the politics of governance in Indonesia
shall be appreciated and immediately ad-
vanced, as they convincingly confront the
neo-institutionalists orthodoxy and provide
a more dynamic snapshot of the post-Suharto
Indonesian studies.
This paper has obivously investigated
how governance discourse and its appara-
tuses operate in disciplining society through
development policies. Such discourse has
sysrmatically produced certain subjects that
open up the possibilities of development in-
tervention policies. In Indonesian context, the
dominance of such discourse goes hand in
hand with the massive project of political re-
forms in the post-authoritarian regime. Vari-
ous attempts to transform Indonesian poli-
tics, that are highly dominated by the neo-
institutionalist optimism, are now facing se-
vere paradoxes.
It is worthy noticing that the recent
works on Indonesian politics that focus on
the power relations have significantly con-
tributed to the post-Suharto studies by ap-
proaching the dynamics of ‘domestic’ poli-
tics resulted from neo-institutional reforms
and governance governmentality. Michel
Foucault has cautiously warned, as I cited in
the front page, that if we consider the imma-
nent productions of power and ‘the political’
characters within society it would be inevi-
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table to recognize and to examine the omni-
presence of relations of power and how such
relations are embedded. Within this spirit, it
is necessary to advance the studies of politics
to the more radical ones.
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